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Because of features that appear to be inherent in many social systems,
modellers face complicated and subjective choices in positioning the scien-
tiﬁc contribution of their research. This leads to a diversity of approaches
and terminology, making interdisciplinary assessment of models highly
problematic.
Such modellers ideally need some kind of accessible, interdisciplinary
framework to better understand and assess these choices. Existing texts
tend either to take a specialised metaphysical approach, or focus on more
pragmatic aspects such as the simulation process or descriptive protocols
for how to present such research. Without a sufﬁciently neutral treatment
of why a particular set of methods and style of model might be chosen,
these choices can become entwined with the ideological and terminologi-
cal baggage of a particular discipline.
This paper attempts to provide such a framework. We begin with an
epistemological model, which gives a standardised view on the types of
validation available to the modeller, and their impact on scientiﬁc value.
This is followed by a methodological framework, presented as a taxon-
omy of the key dimensions over which approaches are ultimately divided.
Rather than working top-down from philosophical principles, we charac-
terise the issues as a practitioner would see them. We believe that such
a characterisation can be done ‘well enough’, where ‘well enough’ repre-
sents a common frame of reference for all modellers, which nevertheless
respects the essence of the debate’s subtleties and can be accepted as such
by a majority of ‘methodologists’.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of such an approach, and
potential further work for such a framework to be absorbed into existing,
descriptive protocols and general social simulation texts.
Keywords: social simulation, methodology, epistemology, ideology, vali-
dation1 Introduction: Purpose & Goals
To set some overall context, ﬁgure 1 gives an abstract representation of the
overall simulation process, emphasising the role of epistemological and
methodological choices; compare the beginning practitioner view in Gilbert & Troitzsch
(2005, §2).
Figure 1: An abstraction of the overall simulation process. Black arrows
show broadly sequential processes. Red arrows show the main feedback
routes by which design decisions are adjusted
There is clearly iteration between the steps but, broadly speaking,
decisions on scientiﬁc positioning come ﬁrst. The researcher then pro-
gresses through formal (computational) model design, to software devel-
opment and simulation experimentation (with empirical data gathering as
required). Data analysis is the main mechanism by which previous de-
sign decisions are re-evaluated and the process iterated. (This is analysis
both of real-world empirical data and the synthetic data produced by the
simulation, often in comparison with each other.)
We will focus on scientiﬁc positioning, which includes:
2• The nature of the research questions. This covers the scope and pur-
pose of what we want to know about the real world.
• Epistemological and methodological choices. These cover the ways in
which modelling and simulation can give us scientiﬁcally valid knowledge
about these research questions.
It is crucial to note that there is very strong interplay between these two
elements. Research questions suggest epistemological and methodological
choices, but the latter also suggest particular ways of viewing the problem
(and, indeed, the real world). This paper is concerned with a framework
which allows for an interdisciplinary characterisation of these epistemological and
methodological choices, the aim being to promote a ‘universal’ understand-
ing of how social simulation research is scientiﬁcally positioned (the ‘why?’
behind the research). Whilst the nature of the research questions is also
part of this ‘why?’, understanding it typically presents little difﬁculty.
To justify our approach, we need to answer the following questions:
• What are the issues with positioning social simulation research in
particular?
• How are they addressed in the current literature?
• What makes the approach here different, and how does it aid the
ﬁeld?
1.1 Scientiﬁc Positioning: Difﬁcult Choices for Social Simula-
tion
Epistemological and methodological debates in social system modelling
are driven by the nature of social systems and the inherent difﬁculties in
applying simulation as a formalised, computational approach.
The physical sciences are underpinned by universal mathematical laws,
which typically allow for precise, quantitative matches to many real-world
systems. The consistency of these laws also allows for strong predictive
accuracy, and their relative simplicity means that Occam’s razor is a useful
measure in determining the validity of one theory over another; such cri-
teria of adequacy are discussed by Schick & Vaughn (2007) and Chalmers
(1999). Thus, the researcher in these ﬁelds is typically presented with
fairly simple, objective choices of epistemology and methodology. We de-
ﬁne such choices as one pole of an axis (ﬁgure 2), where moving towards
the opposite pole reﬂects the increasing difﬁculty in making choices as we
model more complex systems.
3Figure 2: An ‘axis of difﬁculty’ for epistemological and methodological
choices
Social systems can be regarded as potentially the furthest towards this
second pole, for reasons as follows.
System Complexity. Nearly all social systems are profoundly complex,
and some would argue inherently so for the purposes of modelling (Edmonds & Moss
2005). They are interconnected and not easily isolatable (e.g., mar-
kets for different products). Furthermore, they involve many interac-
tions between different types of entitites (e.g., between individuals,
or between individuals and structural institutions— the latter them-
selves a product of individual interactions). Because the participants
are human, they are uniquely able to perceive structural aspects of
the system and change or react to them, introducing complex feed-
back effects between humans and their environment1.
Limited Accuracy. Primarily due to this complexity, and the fact that the
system’s structure and rules may be volatile over time, social system
1For a representative discussion, see Gilbert’s article on structuration (Gilbert 1996).
Of course, this is a very wide topic and also relates to debates on whether particular
modelling techniques, such as agent-based modelling, may be better ways to reﬂect such
complexity and how it inﬂuences macro-level properties of the system. This is reﬂected
later in this paper.
4models tend to lack broad accuracy; particularly predictive accuracy,
but also quantitative descriptive accuracy. As Gilbert and Troitzsch
put it:
“[...] social scientists tend to be more concerned with
understanding and explanation [than prediction]. This is
due to scepticism about the possibility of making social
predictions, based on both the inherent difﬁculty of do-
ing so and also the possibility, peculiar to social and eco-
nomic forecasting, that the forecast itself will affect the out-
come.” (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005, p.6)
This helps perpetuate a range of ideological approaches since, to use
Kuhn’s view of science (Kuhn 1970), a dominant paradigm has not
yet emerged (predictive accuracy being a primary means by which
the superiority of a particular approach would be demonstrated).
This has the follow-on effect that there is a proliferation of styles of
model, with less efforts towards direct comparison and standardisa-
tion than in disciplines with more constrained methodologies; some-
thing which many social scientists would like to change (Axelrod
1997; Richiardi et al. 2006).
It also means that, in the absence of broad quantitative accuracy,
empirical validation will be against qualitative patterns or selective
quantitative measures. Debate therefore ensues over how best to se-
lect such data (Windrum et al. 2007; Moss 2008; Brenner & Werker
2007). There are also more fundamental questions over what type of
mechanisms should be built into models (e.g., empirically-backed or
not) to make such accuracy more likely; these questions can be intra-
discipline (Edmonds & Moss 2005) or effectively deﬁne the bound-
aries between disciplines (e.g., the differences between economic soci-
ology and neoclassical economics presentedby Swedberg et al. (1987)).
Much of this is caught up with social science’s long tradition of ad-
vocating approaches which tend to reject the possibility of general-
isable ‘laws of human behaviour’ and focus on the sociohistorical
context of the social system (Eisenstadt & Curelaru (1976, §8.6) use
the term “historical-systemic”). For modelling, this relates to the
degree to which context-speciﬁc cultural factors affect behavioural
patterns, as opposed to biological traits (Read 1990).
The lack of agreed axiomatic laws means that we potentially need a
model-centric conception of social science, where theory is represented
by a family of models (McKelvey 2002).
5Issues with Empirical Data. Social systems are not easily isolatable, and
the mechanisms by which they operate vary over time (so the so-
cial scientist may be limited by available historic data). In addition,
many theoretical concepts are not easily formalised quantitatively
such as, to use Bailey’s example (1988), a person’s sense of power-
lessness. This engenders further debate into how experimental and
data collection techniques are designed and validated (Bailey 1988).
1.1.1 Other Disciplines
As ﬁgure 2 suggests, such issues are not unique to the social sciences,
and will generally occur in all areas where systems exhibit highly com-
plex interactions (of individuals, structural entities, systems, etc.). This in-
cludes more directly comparable areas such as organisational theory and
ecological modelling (particularly animal behaviour modelling), but also
physical-science-based ones such as climate modelling. In the latter case,
though the constituent elements (dynamics, radiation, surface processes
and resolution) are strongly believed to be well identiﬁed and to operate
according to fundamental laws of physics, the complexity of their interac-
tion means that climate models retain a very short predictively accurate
window, and only at restricted resolutions (Shackley et al. 1998).
Thus, we should not ignore the treatment of similar debates in these
disciplines and, to that end, works from various disciplines are cited herein,
without justifying each time why the ideas are relevant.
1.2 Our Approach in Context
We have shown the difﬁculties in making positional choices for social sim-
ulation. In particular, the ways to view and make these choices are typi-
cally entwined with the various disciplines and schools of thought which
they engender; Windrum et al.’s discussion on validation techniques for
agent-based models (2007) and Moss’s response (2008) provide a good ex-
ample. Given that such schools often have their own terminological bag-
gage, it often becomes difﬁcult to ‘see the wood for the trees’ and under-
stand the common dimensions which differing approaches are opposed
over (or perhaps agreeing on, but with different ﬂavours of agreement).
Fundamentally, interdisciplinary assessments of scientiﬁc value and credibility
prove difﬁcult.
This paper therefore attempts to provide a framework for a discipline-
neutral understanding of these epistemological and methodological choices,
which we believe is essential to improve the scientiﬁc assessment of social
simulation research. Since social systems are just one ﬂavour of complex
6adaptive systems (CASs), and we draw on literature from other areas, our
framework may have some wider applicability. (We discuss this further in
section 4.)
Rather than working top-down from philosophical principles, we char-
acterise the issues as a practitioner would see them. We believe that such a
characterisation can be done ‘well enough’, where ‘well enough’ represents
an accessible common frame of reference for all modellers, which neverthe-
less respects the essence of the debate’s subtleties and can be accepted as
such by a majority of ‘methodologists’. (By referring to the more details
debates, we also provide ‘jumping-off points’ for further study as desired.)
We begin with an epistemological model, which gives a standardised
view on the types of validation available to the modeller and their impact
on scientiﬁc value (section 2, based on a model-centric view of science).
This is followed by a methodological framework, presented as a taxonomy
of the key dimensions over which approaches are ultimately divided (sec-
tion 3). We conclude by discussing some of the framework’s limitations,
and potential further work for such a framework to be absorbed into ex-
isting, descriptive protocols and general social simulation texts (section 4).
Elsewhere in the literature, such issues are usually discussed in one
of four types of work, each of which we believe does not provide the
accessible, interdisciplinary view that we are aiming for here:
Simulation textbooks. These, such as Gilbert & Troitzsch (2005), are gen-
erally aimed at the practical training of researchers new to simula-
tion. Thus, they tend to focus on the general set of techniques (types
of simulation, validation methods) and the software development
process, with only an introductory or implicit coverage of more ide-
ological issues2.
Philosophy of (social) science. These tend to explore the broader meta-
physical debates on how social science research can and should be
conducted (Eisenstadt & Curelaru 1976; Burrell & Morgan 1979; McKelvey
2002; Gilbert 2004), such as contrasts between positivism vs. realism
and etic vs. emic analyses (Gilbert 2004). This ‘top-down’ context is
typically less useful for the average simulation researcher because:
the discussion can be abstruse; and, by choosing to conduct simula-
tion research, some epistemological choices have already been made
(i.e., that a formal, computational model can provide useful knowl-
edge on a real world system), which makes some of the debate su-
perﬂuous and the remainder difﬁcult to tease out.
2There is also the potential for the author, explicitly or not, to reﬂect their own ideologi-
cal preferences— see Manzo’s chapter 4 comments in his review of Gilbert’s “Agent-Based
Models” (Manzo 2008).
7Speciﬁc methodological papers. These tend to focus on a particular issue—
such as empirical validation (Windrum et al. 2007)— or a particular
ideology’s defence of its position in relation to another (Goldspink
2002; Brenner & Werker 2007; Moss 2008). Though these works give
some useful abstractions, they do not give a sufﬁciently neutral global
view, and often requires specialised knowledge of the particular
philosophical points in question.
Pragmatic methodological protocols. These try to standardise how sim-
ulation model research is presented in the literature, and therefore
have quite similar aims to our work here. Richiardi et al. (2006) com-
pile a thoughtful and well-referenced protocol for agent-based social
simulations. Since many of its points apply equally to any agent-
based simulation, it is perhaps no surprise that this echoes similar
attempts in other disciplines, such as Grimm et al.’s ODD protocol
in ecological modelling (2006): this builds on previous heuristic con-
siderations (Grimm et al. 1996; Grimm 1999), and was applied more
recently to social models (Polhill et al. 2008).
However, the main point here is that these protocols focus on a de-
scriptive classiﬁcation of the discrete factors which need to be con-
sidered and disseminated, without consistently giving insight into
why a particular combination of techniques might be chosen. In par-
ticular, without this ‘why’, there is a certain suggestion that the sci-
entiﬁc value of a simulation study is correlated to the level of detail
provided across all the deﬁned areas— that is, more rigorous esti-
mation, validation, and the like implies ‘better’ science. Yet, this is
typically not the case. Certain approaches may largely ignore some
points as irrelevant, whilst considering themselves no less scientiﬁc.
Without a complete context for the ‘why?’, the erstwhile modeller
has only a limited conception of which points are more difﬁcult to
make a decision on, which are more entwined with decisions made
elsewhere, and which are tacit ‘dogmas’ of their own particular disci-
pline. Therefore, there is clear scope for such descriptive protocols to
be merged with aspects of the framework presented here; we discuss
this in the conclusions (section 4).
1.2.1 A Note on the Term Agent-Based
Richiardi et al. talk about agent-based models. Agency has no ﬁrm def-
inition as such, but a much-cited one is that used by Wooldridge (2002),
where the focus is on agents situated in an environment and autonomously
8able to react to it3. However, in the looser sense, agent-based models
(ABMs) are often regarded as any model which explicitly models interact-
ing individuals, typically with variation at the individual level. In ecol-
ogy, the term individual-based models (IBMs) is used instead, emphasis-
ing that the focus is on genetic and phenotypic variation at the individual
level, rather than other aspects of agency. (We reference several ideas from
IBM modelling later.)
In this paper, we use the term agent-based in the wider sense, and in-
terchangeably with individual-based, as Grimm also recommends (Grimm
2008). The choice of one or the other will generally depend on what liter-
ature we are discussing (and the terms used therein).
2 A Model-Centred Epistemology
If we are going to deﬁne a taxonomy to characterise the scientiﬁc posi-
tioning of social system simulations, we need to more formally deﬁne this
positioning in the context of the scientiﬁc process. As McKelvey points
out (McKelvey 2002), demonstrating how the wide range of approaches
can ﬁt within a single scientiﬁc epistemology is a non-trivial task, there
being approaches which appear to reject aspects of the traditional ‘scien-
tiﬁc method’ in varying degrees.
We build on an epistemologypresentedby McKelvey (2002) and Azevedo
(2002) from organisational science (there are slight differences between
their approaches, but the common core is what we are interested in)4. It
is based on the semantic conception developed by philosophers such as
Suppes, Suppe and Giere, but the point is that this can be shown to serve
our purposes in practice, whether or not some approaches in the ﬁeld are
inspired by slightly different philosophical principles.
This epistemological model deﬁnes concepts and terms related to the
various forms of validation within the modelling process, which are im-
portant in understanding the methodological taxonomy later (section 3).
2.1 Core Framework
The key features of McKelvey and Azevedo’s framework are as below,
and are summarised in ﬁgure 3 (which compares it to the ‘Newtonian’
axiomatic view).
3The meaning of ‘autonomous’ for a deterministic software system remains ambiguous,
as noted by McArthur et al. (2007).
4Goldspink (2002) also builds on McKelvey’s model but, unlike us, does this to advocate
a speciﬁc (situated research based) methodology.
9Science as Explaining the Dynamics of Phase Spaces. The quality of a sci-
ence is governed by how well its models explain the dynamics of the
phase space of the system in question (i.e., the space of all dimen-
sions of the system). This could be at the level of predicting quali-
tative changes, rather than quantitative accuracy of detail (the latter
tending to be the aim of the axiom-driven physical sciences).
Theories explain Isolated, Idealised Systems. There is never complete rep-
resentation and explanation of the system, but of an abstracted one
which, nevertheless, provides “an accurate characterization of what
the phenomenonwould have been had it been an isolated system” (McKelvey
2002, p.762, quoting Suppe).
Model Centredness. A set of models represents the theory, and this set
will typically explore different aspects of the system in question (us-
ing different abstractions). There is not necessarily any deﬁnitive
axiomatic base, though this is not precluded for some or all of the
set of models. As McKelvey puts it: “Thus, ‘truth’ is not deﬁned in
terms of reduction to a single axiom-based model”.
Put simply, models are ﬁrst class citizens of science.
We view this is an intuitively ‘correct’ representation of complex sys-
tems science, that helps orient modellers regarding the ‘point’ of social
simulations, even if their model focuses only on a particular aspect of the
real-world system.
Azevedo (2002) provides a simple, yet powerful, analogy for this model-
centred epistemology, which can be a useful summary for the detail above.
She sees models as maps. Different types of maps are appropriate in dif-
ferent situations (e.g., a contour map for terrain analysis, or a symbolic
map of key checkpoints for journey planning); equivalently, models may
serve different purposes (e.g., state transition prediction versus detailed
quantitative prediction within a state). A suitably specialised map can be
more useful than the actual, physical area itself for a particular problem;
equivalently, a particular model abstraction might cleanly represent one
particular real-world aspect better than a massively detailed ‘reconstruc-
tion’ of the real thing.
2.1.1 Model Usage and Adequacy Testing
More speciﬁcally, McKelvey introduces some very useful concepts on the
types of validation the researcher might aim for and, citing Read (1990),
how the use to which they put their model reﬂects this (and can be char-
acterised).
10Figure 3: Comparing an axiomatic epistemology with a model-centred
(semantic conception based) one— McKelvey and Azevedo’s core position
(diagram as per McKelvey (2002), with extra explanatory text and model
shading to indicate its key position)
Models can be used as concrete representations of theory (in Read’s
terminology, a ModelT usage). When used in this way, the research focuses
on the exploration of (complex) theory and its potential consequences for
the isolated, idealised system in question (without having to necessarily
predict real-world behaviour); it can potentially show dissonance within the
current theory and suggest potential changes of detail or direction. This is
effectively a form of theory–model validation, and McKelvey refers to it
as analytical adequacy testing.
A good example would be Schelling’s famous segregationmodel (Schelling
1971). He uses a simple cellular automata to show that strong racial seg-
regation can occur with only mild individual racial preferences. Thus, the
‘point’ was to question whether existing theory was really looking at the
issue in the right way, and to alert theorists into the possibilities of emer-
11gent, system-level behaviour which is unintuitive given the individual-
level rules.
Models can also be used to represent processes which reproduce (de-
scribe) some aspect of real-world empirical data (Read’s ModelD usage).
Schelling’s original research might have suggested such a use, but its pri-
mary purpose was theoretical. If some other piece of research determined
empirical values for individual preferences, and then used the model to
predict the system-level pattern in some way, then this research would be
a ModelD usage. Thus, such a usage will tend to focus on statistical tech-
niques to determine goodness of ﬁt. This is effectively model–phenomena
validation, and is referred to by McKelvey as ontological adequacy test-
ing.
Equally, a statistical regression ﬁt to data represents a model with this
ModelD usage, but one which has been developed bottom-up from data,
rather than top-down via posited theoretical mechanisms. As Read notes
(Read 1990, p.34), such research still has some theoretical basis (for why
this particular statistical model was deemed applicable), but the research
is interested only in whether it ﬁts the data, not exploring its theoretical
origins or consequences (if this was explored, this part of the research
would be ModelT usage).
This demonstrates that the usage is a property of the piece of research,
not the model per se (hence the emphasis on ‘usage’). We will use the
terms theoretical model usage for ModelT usage, and descriptive model
usage for ModelD usage. To avoid awkward prose, we also sometimes say
that a model ‘is’ a theoretical model, meaning that it is being used as a
theoretical model in the particular context we are discussing. Although
the terms ‘theoretical’ and ‘descriptive’ are very general, we have found
them to be the ones which most closely reﬂect the exact distinction, which
is to do with the epistemological purpose of the modelling research, not
how it is derived5.
5For example, bottom-up vs. top-down refers to the method, not the purpose. It also has
the dual meanings of ‘from data’ vs. ‘from theory’ and ‘generating emergent behaviour’
(as per Epstein & Axtell (1996)) vs. ‘system-level rules’.
In ecology, Roughgarden et al. (1996) use the concepts of ’minimal models for ideas’,
’minimal models for a system’, and ’synthetic model for a system’, which represent in-
creasingly descriptive uses of the model. This is much more like what we want, but tends
to refers to the model itself, not the research using it. There is also the idea of progres-
sion here which we are not comfortable with. For example, one could have a model which
replicates an existing model that closely compares to real-world data (i.e., this other model
is used in a strongly descriptive way). However, the purpose might be to show that the
original modellers had overlooked a sensitivity to some crucial parameter which affected
the plausability of their empirical matches. Thus, the new research is really a theoreti-
cal use of the model, not a descriptive one, since it doesn’t offer alternatives to ﬁx the
empirical accuracy problems.
12Notice that analytical and ontological adequacy tests make the very
useful division between theory–model and model–phenomena validation.
It is worth emphasising that typical empirical tests (e.g., a statistical ﬁt
against some particular measure) are not just ontological adequacy tests:
they are effectively testing a combination of analytical and ontological ad-
equacy, since the researcher cannot separate whether any lack of ﬁt is due
to the model being a generally inappropriate one (ontological adequacy
issues), or that some invalid formalisation was made in transitioning from
theory to model (analytical adequacy issues). Stanislaw (1986) discusses
this, and the resultant need for specialised tests which can isolate a particu-
lar type of adequacy test: for example, experimenting with small structural
changes to the model to determine whether certain decisions in formalis-
ing the model may have signiﬁcant effects on the behaviour (analytical
adequacy).
Therefore, both types of adequacy may be explored in parallel. A
model which can be shown to fulﬁll both theoretical and descriptive uses
will be a useful piece of empirical science but, crucially, there is still sci-
entiﬁc value in each usage type taken separately: theory–model and model–
phenomena research are separate and equally viable scientiﬁc endeavours.
2.2 Extensions for Social System Simulations
There are some useful extensions that we can make to capture the par-
ticular epistemological context for social system simulations. Each of these
is explained in the sections which follow, and each can be represented
diagrammatically in a simple way, building cumulatively from Figure 4,
which represents McKelvey’s model-centred base in stripped-down form.
The additional features added each time are marked in red on the re-
vised diagrams. Note that we are only looking at the epistemological con-
cepts here; the positional taxonomy will expand further on how particular
methodological approaches in the literature map to this framework, and
what aspects they choose to focus on.
These extensions deﬁne some new validation types, which also allows
this epistemological model to be more directly compared to other valida-
tion frameworks (Stanislaw 1986; Bailey 1988). We believe that our model
offers certain advantages, but the argument is more of interest to method-
ologists and so is left to appendix B.
2.2.1 The Importance of Model Usages and Usage Transitions
The modeller faces an important choice on which mix of theoretical and
descriptive model usage their modelling research is going to explore, which
13Figure 4: The base McKelvey model, ready for the addition of our social
simulation amendments
we explore further in the methodological taxonomy (section 3); in many
ways, this choice is an iterative one, inﬂuenced by the results from simula-
tion experiments.
In addition, the arguments by which modellers move between the two
usages is of key epistemological interest. Figure 5 shows this.
The transition from theoretical to descriptive usage is what we will call
the bridging argument, as used by Voorrips (1987). This argument is the
formation of a hypothesis on how some aspect of the real world works
(e.g., by analogy from theory in another ﬁeld). Its validity in itself will be
related to subjective assessment by criteria of adequacy such as testability,
simplicity and conservatism (Schick & Vaughn 2007). Such an argument
is often made implictly; for example where a particular theory is intu-
itively postulated from examination of the empirical data, without any
more formalised consideration of alternatives or the theoretical context.
To paraphrase Read’s example from Hill’s archaeological research (Read
1990) , statistical relationships were explored between the spatial position
of some remains and their type (e.g., storage jar). The implicit theory was
that particular rooms were used for particular purposes and so, assum-
ing little depositional disturbance over time, there would be a correlation.
However, the focus was on corroborating the statistical ﬁt and not on jus-
14Figure 5: Adding concepts for model usages and usage transitions
tifying the theoretical premises or, for example, considering rival theories
which might also result in such a correlation.
The reverse transition (descriptive to theoretical usage) involves the
positing of theoretical mechanisms which can be shown to result in the
regularities observed in the original descriptive model, and which ﬁt into
the existing theoretical context. This is therefore part of the theory–model
validation (i.e., analytical adequacy testing).
2.2.2 Better Reﬂect Status of Empirical Data
McKelvey’s view shows models being validated against phenomena. We
noted in our introduction that there are extensive debates regarding the
use of empirical data in model formulation, and empirical data’s rela-
tionship to the underlying real-world system. In particular, the choice of
empirical data is never truly objective, in that it is inﬂuenced by theoretical
considerations and biases6.
6This is a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science, as discussed by
Chalmers (1999). Despite attempts by the ‘new experimentalists’ (e.g., Mayo) to ground
science on an objective set of severely tested experiments, the experimentally-driven ap-
15Figure 6: Adding concepts for the status of empirical data
This motivates some further reﬁnements, shown in Figure 6:
• We reﬂect the distinction between the real-world system as a data-
generating process and the observed empirical data that it gener-
ates (Windrum et al. 2007).
• Empirical data is linked to theory, to reﬂect that it is used in the
formulation of theory and hence (indirectly) the model. Since the
choice of what empirical data is appropriate, and the role of a priori
assumptions, is ideology dependent, we show this as a theoretical
ﬁlter on this use of empirical data.
• Similarly, a theoretical ﬁlter is applied to the observation process by
proach remains inﬂuenced by theoretical considerations.
16which empirical data is obtained from the real-world system.
2.2.3 Computational Models and Software Adequacy
Figure 1 illustrated that the modeller has to move from a formal model to
an actual software implementation. As well as the software engineering,
this may also involve developing or using algorithms to approximate the
required mathematics of the formal model (e.g., computing an integral by
numerical methods). This process also has to take account of potential nu-
merical issues which may produce artifactual system dynamics, perhaps
due to precision errors— see, for example, Polhill et al., as discussed by
Edmonds & Moss (2005, §3).
For our purposes, the point is that this is really a separate type of vali-
dation (see ﬁgure 7). We deﬁne this new validation as software adequacy
testing, since it is all directly related to validating the adequacy of the soft-
ware representation, with respect to the conceptual (mathematical) model.
Hence, we can also refer to it as conceptual–computational model vali-
dation. To accomodate this deﬁnition, we more strictly deﬁne analytical
adequacy testing as related to testing the relationship between theory and
a formal conceptual model.
2.2.4 Explanatory Ability and Causal Adequacy
Descriptive accuracy does not necessarily imply that a model is a valid
explanation of phenomena. Essentially, a causal explanation has to have
other evidential support for its mechanisms being the ‘real’ ones, since
just replicating empirical data is a weak argument: inﬁnitely many other
systems could potentially generate the same data. Thus, ontological ad-
equacy does not cover this required validation. We also cannot take it as
included in analytical adequacy, since this focuses only on the model as a
representation of the theory.
Therefore, we need a new type of adequacy test. We deﬁne causal
adequacy testing as between theory and empirical data from the real-
world system (see ﬁgure 8). Note that this occurs outside the simulation
process— the simulation only tests the descriptive accuracy of the model,
not whether the model’s mechanisms can be shown to actually work like
that (individually) in the real world.
Grüne-Yanoff (2009) emphasises why this evidence is difﬁcult for so-
cial systems: there are often ‘fuzzy’ social concepts which are difﬁcult to
formalise and observe in the real-world system (to empirically conﬁrm
causal adequacy). He points out that there is a weaker position that the
simulation is a potential causal explanation. However, this is also problem-
17Figure 7: Accounting for the computational nature of the model with soft-
ware adequacy
atic for social models because they often have many degrees of freedom,
and can thus potentially reproduce empirical data with many parameter
variations (so they do not narrow down the potential explanations very
far); a lack of wider predictive accuracy is also an indicator that any accu-
racy for particular case studies may be such ‘data-ﬁtting’, rather than true
explanation.
18Figure 8: Adding the need to validate the proposed causal mechanisms
against reality— causal adequacy
2.2.5 Reﬂecting Stakeholder-Centric Approaches
As a particular variant of the sociohistorically-oriented approaches dis-
cussed earlier, there is a signiﬁcant body of social simulation research
which uses systemparticipants and external experts as central to the model
design and testing process: what we will call a stakeholder-centric ap-
proach. The principal aim is to reach a shared understanding of, and
19belief in, the workings of the model and what it shows.
In a policy-making context, this is related to the pragmatic view that
the model can only be useful if the stakeholders believe it and feel that it
represents their views accurately. Such an approach is traditionally taken
by the Operational Research (OR) community, for problems where the
concern is with social/business interactions rather than manufacturing or
logistical issues; the latter are problems where there often are standard the-
oretical models which predict the real-world system well (e.g., queueing
theory for assembly lines). Howick et al.’s studies of change management
in large projects (2008) fall squarely into this category, with efforts to bet-
ter integrate more participatory approaches into the modelling process via
their modelling cascade methodology.
In social systems modelling, the companion modelling approach es-
poused by Barreteau et al. (2003) more directly enshrines this stakeholder
centricity as a fundamental tenet:
“Instead of proposing a simpliﬁcation of stakeholders knowl-
edge, the model is seeking a mutual recognition of everyone
representationof the problematique under study.” (Barreteau et al.
2003, §4.3— sic)
This is a particular ﬂavour of the view that theory is represented by
a set of models which explore different abstract, idealised systems: in
this case, the abstraction is stakeholder-centric. As Moss points out, this
means that such models may only be valid in the context of the stakehold-
ers that they are informing. Whilst all sociohistorical approaches imply
constraints on how general a class of systems their theory is likely to ap-
ply to, stakeholder-centric ones also constrain our system deﬁnition to the
system as perceived and agreed subjectively by the stakeholders; the principal
aim becomes the addition of formal precision to debate, not the accurate
forecasting of future behaviour (Moss 2008).
This motivates a revision to our homogeneous deﬁnition of theory by
adding an objective–subjective dimension in ﬁgure 9. This is a useful
pragmatic distinction in understanding what knowledge the model is try-
ing to capture and potentially explain. (There are potentially some deeper
philosophical issues with the concept of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ theory,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper, and does not outweigh the prac-
tical usefulness of the terms.) Note that we are not using ‘generalised–
contextual’ or similar, since this can be confused with the more general
constraint on the theory’s scope of application7.
7This is often closely linked to the ‘subjectivity’ of the theory, but is not the same thing.
20Figure 9: Incorporating stakeholder-centric approaches: considering the-
ory as objective or subjective
3 Positional Taxonomy
The aim here is to present a taxonomy which reﬂects the essential, high-
level issues which underpin epistemological and methodological decisions
A stakeholder-based model is often limited in its applicability to the particular system
that the particular stakeholders are part of. However, there may be other stakeholders in
the same system who were not included in the modelling, and so it will not necessarily
represent their views.
21when creating social simulation models. The categorisation is via a set
of dimensions, each of which is a continuum of positions between two
extremes (poles). Attempting to tease out these categories from debates in
the literature involves both:
• the aggregation of largely independent debates which we argue are
really different aspects of, or responses to, more fundamental ideo-
logical questions;
• the identiﬁcation of the core methodological principles underlying
general approaches— e.g., KIDS8 (Edmonds & Moss 2005) or abduc-
tive simulation (Werker & Brenner 2004)— and the conﬁrmation that
these can be suitably characterised by the taxonomy.
One useful heuristic is that, when the classiﬁcation is applied to a large
number of approaches in the literature, the positions on the various axes
should be largely independent; i.e., if a position on one dimension cor-
relates with a position on another most of the time, that probably means
that those dimensions do not represent distinct enough ideological issues.
Figure 10: An overview of the proposed taxonomy
The taxonomy is summarised in ﬁgure 10. We have already shown
that the decision regarding the mix of theoretical and descriptive model
uses is particularly key for establishing the epistemological purpose of the
8Keep It Descriptive Stupid. Note that this is not descriptive in the sense of our de-
scriptive model usage; Edmonds and Moss’s use of the term is related to the Apriorist –
Empirical and Universally Simple – Naturally Complex dimensions (see later).
22research. Hence, this forms the most fundamental dimension (Theoretical–
Descriptive), which will tend to govern and be inﬂuenced by decisions on
other dimensions. These other dimensions split into two natural domains:
how the model is structured, and how it is explored through experiment
(simulation runs).
Each dimension is explained in the sections which follow. To help con-
ﬁrm the applicability of the taxonomy to the range of approaches men-
tioned throughout this document, appendix A provides a concise sum-
mary of each approach’s position on the various axes.
3.1 Theoretical – Descriptive
The basic concepts of theoretical and descriptive usages are covered at
length in the epistemological model (particularly with relation to how a
model can be both theoretical and descriptive, and the bridging argument
between such uses). This is something of an ‘odd one out’ dimension,
because it is not really a dimension: a piece of research could have strong
theoretical and descriptive model uses, though this would be unusual.
However, there are some practical subtleties which a modeller needs
to be aware of when making this choice.
3.1.1 The Iterative Nature of the Choice
This choice is the one which can most change during the course of the re-
search, because it is strongly governed by the outcomes of simulation runs,
and how they cause the researcher to re-assess the nature and purpose of
their model (refer back to ﬁgure 1).
A piece of simulation research which starts out as an attempt at em-
pirical accuracy may end up being more useful as a theoretical result. A
classic example would be Lorenz’ attempt to model simpliﬁed weather
systems via convection equations (Lorenz 1963). This ended up being a
theoretical result (and presentedas such), since it transpired that his model
showed unusual effects such as sensitive dependence on initial conditions
and bounded, yet non periodic, solutions. That is, it showed hitherto un-
seen dynamical properties of a simple, nonlinear system which also served
to show the potential problems in trying to use the model descriptively for
predictive accuracy. The paper turned out to be important in helping de-
ﬁne chaos theory, and it was only later that researchers realised that such
issues could also be useful for descriptive model uses, since they could be
used to explain apparently complex behaviour via simple equations.
Because of this, it is important for the position on this axis to be clearly
stated. Simulation tends to have an ability to seduce with its re-enactment
23of a model in dynamic operation, especially for agent-based models where
the deﬁned individuals and their rules tend to have an ‘immediate believ-
ability’ (unlike, say, a set of differential equations). Bullock highlights
such issues for artiﬁcial life (ALife) modelling, which tend to be theoret-
ical models that can sometimes be erroneously interpreted as suggesting
direct descriptive uses:
“In addition, there is little explicit work on combatting the
downside of a simulation model’s immediacy — the tendency
of some audiences to ‘project’ added reality onto a simple sim-
ulation, mistakenly understanding the superﬁcial similarity be-
tween simulated agents and real organisms as the point of a
model, for instance.” (Wheeler et al. 2002, §3.1)
3.1.2 Stylised Facts as Descriptive Models
We explained previously that, in the absence of broad empirical accuracy,
much social systems research has to focus on qualitative accuracy in re-
producing important patterns in the data: these patterns are often called
‘stylised facts’ in the literature. This is discussed in more detail within the
Qualitative Validation – Quantitative Validation dimension, but there are a
couple of points relevant here. We use Sallans et al.’s agent-based model of
integrated consumer and ﬁnancial markets as an example (2003). Their pa-
per focuses on showing that their model can reproduce some key stylised
facts.
Firstly, we should note that stylised facts are descriptive models by
deﬁnition (though not simulation models): they formalise patterns in the
empirical data without providing any explanatory mechanisms for them.
Secondly, each of the stylised facts may have been derived by a bottom-
up approach (statistically inferring patterns from data) or from a separate
theoretically-derived model which was also shown to act as a valid de-
scriptive model. Sallans et al. (2003) has examples of both:
• For the former, high price volatility (“price volatility is highly auto-
correlated. Empirically, market volatility is known to come in ‘clus-
ters’.”): this is something observed empirically by market analysts.
(It may also be predicted by other theoretical models, but we assume
that it was ﬁrst observed ‘on the ﬂoor’.)
• For the latter, low predictability of price movements: it is an outcome
of the efﬁcient market hypothesis (a theoretical model) which was,
to some degree, borne out by empirical data.
24Thirdly, research which attempts to match to stylised facts (such as
Sallans et al.) is not necessarily just a descriptive use of the model. As
they state, their longer-term aim is to use such a model to explore the
mutual interaction between the two markets, where this paper lays the
groundwork:
“Before we can use the model to investigate inter-market ef-
fects, we have to satisfy ourselves that it behaves in a reason-
able way.” (Sallans et al. 2003, §1.5)
This is therefore a mix of theoretical and descriptive uses, with the
overall aim being more of a theoretical one: it attempts to show that their
agent-based theory provides an alternative theoretical approach to conven-
tional microeconomic models (one that produces types of behaviour which
cannot easily be reproduced by conventional models). If agent-based mod-
elling was a more established paradigm, and the particular agent deﬁni-
tions used had been researched separately, then the theoretical usage of
the research would likely be more negligible. As it is, there is an inherent
need to justify the approach and contextualise it within prevailing theory.
It is used descriptively to match the stylised facts, but this is in order to
demonstrate its plausability for further research on other aspects of the
market.
3.1.3 Distinct Types of Theoretical Model Usage
Theoretical model uses allow us to explore the theoretical consequences
of some system model. However, it is important to be clear about where
the model sits with respect to other, empirically-validated theory. There
are three broad possibilities, but with no hard division between them. The
model may:
• try to provide explanatory mechanisms for existing descriptive mod-
els, aiming to provide a more solid theoretical framework which
might have more descriptive potential;
• explore different representations of existing theory, or the effects of
different theoretical assumptions, with the intent of identifying prob-
lematic or underused theoretical avenues;
• explore the qualitative dynamics (primarily) and system level prop-
erties of some generalised abstraction of a real-world concept, nor-
mally with the intent of broadening theory or making parallels be-
tween normally distinct disciplines.
25Only the third of these is what Windrum et al. call “synthetic arti-
ﬁcial worlds which may or may not have a link with the world we ob-
serve” (Windrum et al. 2007, §4.3). The others are just ‘traditional’ models
which are choosing to focus on analytical adequacy. (The second two are
both using simulation for what Axelrod calls discovery: using the model
“for the discovery of new relationships and principles” (Axelrod 1997).)
We have just seen an example of the ﬁrst type: Sallans et al.’s agent-
based model of integrated consumer and ﬁnancial markets (2003). This
was also used as a descriptive model, but only to replicate the empirical
ﬁt of other descriptive models (via stylised facts).
A fairly prototypical example of the second type would be the use
of an individual-based model to compare with a system level one: the
latter are “state variable models” in Grimm’s terminology (Grimm 1999).
The aim here is to show that the individual basis, together with some
empirically-sound form of individual variation, signiﬁcantly affects the
dynamics in a way which suggests that the state variable model might
be inappropriate in at least some circumstances. In this particular case,
we can call this a “paradigmatic” motivation for the model (again, using
Grimm’s terminology): the comparision is between models with different
ideological principles (and hence different positions on our dimensions
here)9. Equally, there could be a less radical change to the model: to show,
for example, that some mechanism originally omitted because it had no
signiﬁcant impact did, in fact, have an impact which had been overlooked
by the original researchers.
Theoretical models of the third type are common in the ﬁeld of ALife,
since this is concerned (amongst other things) with trying to abstract the
essential qualities of life and, by investigating synthetic alternatives which
reproduce these qualities, to broaden theory that is restricted to life as it
happened on Earth (Langton 1987). However, ALife also encompasses the-
oretical models of the ﬁrst type (e.g., Hinton & Nowlan’s demonstration
of the Baldwin effect, as discussed by Di Paolo et al. (2000)) and descrip-
tive usages which attempt to match empirical data and make predictions
(again from Di Paolo et al. (2000), where they discuss the “virtual biology
laboratories” of Kitano et al.). These latter models are classed as AL-
ife because they are attempting to model biological systems as complex
adaptive systems (CASs) via simulation (i.e., they are still using a compu-
tational modelling approach which is considered ‘artiﬁcial’ by mainstream
biology).
9Of course, there are other, less paradigmatic motivations for using individual-based
models (see the Structural – Individualist dimension). However, we are concerned here with
cases where the model is being used as a theoretical model.
26Because of debates regarding the scientiﬁc value of these differing ap-
proaches (e.g., strong versus weak ALife), ALife research has included
considerable methodological discussion which is applicable here (Noble
1997; Di Paolo et al. 2000; Noble et al. 2000; Wheeler et al. 2002). Di Paolo
et al.’s concept of opaque thought experiments, which came out of this
debate, is a very useful description for all the types of theoretical model
discussed here. Theoretical models:
• function as classic thought experiments in giving clarity and precision
to the theoretical consequences of some postulated concepts (nor-
mally in a way which shows dissonance in current theory or a po-
tential new direction);
• are opaque in that the complex consequences are not self-evident,
and thus simulation is required— additionally, an understanding of
how the model has produced the results that it did is needed, and
it is often only this understanding which can be used to make an
effective theoretical argument.
3.1.4 The Pseudo-Engineering Approach
We deﬁne a pseudo-engineering approach as one where a model which
has had little or no theoretical validation is applied directly to the prob-
lem at hand as an applied ‘engineering solution’, without achieving any
signiﬁcant predictive accuracy. (As we have reiterated, this lack of predictive
accuracy is typical for social systems simulation.)
The most common example is where the model is designed ad hoc to ﬁt
a particular problem. The results of such research are normally achieving
some ontological adequacy (often via stylised facts) for current or historic
data. In cases where the model provides some prediction of the real-world
system’s behaviour under conditions different from the current (e.g., un-
der proposed new market rules), there may not even be this ontological
adequacy, it being deemed that the system is different enough in the fu-
ture situation that empirical validation against current or historic data is
meaningless.
This is pseudo-engineering because, in reality, the theory is not valid to
anywhere near the same degree as those of the natural sciences used in
standard engineering: neither analytical/causal adequacy, nor indirectly
via predictive accuracy. We stress that this is perfectly acceptable science
(as discussed in the epistemological model), but that the researcher should
recognise what scientiﬁc value this limits them to.
Firstly, because of the issues with model formalisation and empirical
testing for social systems discussed earlier, there is much less certainty
27that a good empirical ﬁt (without predictive accuracy) implies any kind of
strong explanatory or predictive model.
Secondly, there are many competing paradigms in social science which
are reﬂected in the taxonomy here. Thus, it is important for models to
clearly contextualise themselves and reﬂect what theoretical conclusions
they may or may not bring compared to other approaches to a general
research question. That is, exploration as a theoretical model can add signif-
icant scientiﬁc value. Grimm is very insistent on this point in discussing
how individual-based models in ecology are compared to the traditional,
differential equation based theory of mathematical biology:
“Individual-based modelling, on the other hand, would with-
out reference to the conceptual framework of theoretical pop-
ulation ecology ultimately lead to mere ‘stamp collecting’, not
to theory.” (Grimm 1999, §4.6)
Thirdly, and more pragmatically, explicit analytical adequacy consid-
eration helps avoid theoretical challenges to the work later or, worse, ev-
idence that the bridging argument is unsound. (Read (1990) provides ex-
amples of how this can come unstuck.)
3.1.5 Stakeholder-Centric Approaches
We have seen that such approaches tend to reject the idea of a deﬁnitive
real-world data generation mechanism and focus on adding precision to
debate, not empirical accuracy. (Moss (2008) covers this in detail.) How-
ever, this does not mean that this Theoretical – Descriptive dimension is
inapplicable to such approaches, which will typically be a mixture of the-
oretical and descriptive uses.
In terms of analytical adequacy, the focus is on the formal represen-
tation of subjective stakeholder views (subjective theory); ontological ad-
equacy occurs via validation techniques such as Turing type tests, where
the stakeholders agree that the outputs are consistent with their expec-
tations. (This does not preclude more quantitative comparisons where
the modeller and stakeholders feel it is relevant.) The speciﬁc ideolog-
ical differentiators of stakeholder-centric approaches are captured more
deﬁnitively in other dimensions.
3.1.6 Abductive Simulation and Bridging Arguments
The uniqueness of Werker& Brenner’s abductive simulation approach (2004)
relates to this dimension: it focuses on a deferral of the speciﬁcity of the bridg-
ing argument between theoretical and descriptive uses (refer back to ﬁgure 5).
28It does this by including all empirically-supported theories in the initial
model for a relatively broad class of real-world systems: say, a number of
different countries’ markets for X, where no a priori decision is made as to
whether a particular country Y might require a particular mechanism or
complete set of mechanisms, whilst others do not. A ﬁnal abductive step
is used to try to tease out the most meaningful classiﬁcations and rela-
tionships from sets of model conﬁgurations and empirical datasets which
show a good empirical match. That is, which particular systems may be
well represented by some variant of the generalised model is a decision
which is deferred until after a full set of empirical comparisons is done;
this initial process is therefore computationally and statistically intensive.
3.2 Dimensions Concerning Model Structure
These concern the nature of the mechanisms which will make up the
model. As Eason et al. pithily put it (Eason et al. 1997), simulation models
have aspects which are: supposed to correspond to reality, and are posited
as making a difference; do not correspond to reality, but are posited as
not making a difference. Of course, for any particular system (or class of
systems), there will be other structural design decisions which are consid-
ered important, such as LeBaron’s summary for agent-based market mod-
els (LeBaron 2001). However, we are concerned here with those affecting
the scientiﬁc positioning of the model.
3.2.1 Structural – Individualist
To use McKelvey’s terminology (McKelvey 2002), we can state this as a de-
bate regarding how “idiosyncratic microstates” (heterogeneities amongst
system participants performing the same roles) are treated. A structural
approach focuses on the inﬂuence of social structures (e.g., institutions and
ﬁrms) and the aggregated behaviour of individuals; thus, it assumes away
or statistically treats individual variations. An individualist approach at-
tempts to analyse the emergent structure, by explicitly modelling this vari-
ation. Thus, an individualist might attempt to explain an organisation’s
decision making as the outcome of individual behavioural differences and
social interactions within the enterprise; a structuralist might explain it
according to structural goals for the organisation as an aggregated entity
(e.g., the proﬁt maximisation view of neoclassical economics)10.
10This dimension echoes one of the two used by Burrell & Morgan to characterise soci-
ological paradigms (Burrell & Morgan 1979): namely the one contrasting theories empha-
sising objective, structural aspects of society with those emphasising subjective, individualistic
ones. However, they imply a lot a philosophical baggage which is not always relevant here.
29An individualist approach is often tied up with the notion that com-
plex sets of interactions amongst (potentially differentiated) individuals
may produce structural regularities which are not obvious a priori, with-
out recourse to any centralised mechanism. There has been some success
in reproducing speciﬁc patterns such as ant foraging and trafﬁc jam for-
mation (Resnick 1997), as well as more general fundamentals of human
society (e.g., Epstein & Axtell (1996): this included tribal units, credit
networks, and persistent social inequality). However, in our deﬁnition
here, a structural approach may still be interested in the global effects of
complex interactions, but potentially between more aggregate level enti-
ties, and without an emphasis on individual variation. The system dy-
namics approach (Sterman 2000, for example) is a good example of this,
with its use of coupled differential equations and feedback loops repre-
senting the interaction of various aggregate processes. As an illustration,
Bonabeau (2002) gives the example of a product adoption model which
can be treated in a system dynamics or agent-based manner, with largely
identical results (the system dynamics model reﬂecting the mean-value of
the outcomes of individuals’ interactions). It is only when the agent-based
model (ABM) considers individuals estimating adoption rates from inter-
actions in a spatial neighbourhood (rather than having global knowledge
of them), that any signiﬁcantly different dynamics arise.
Intermediate positions will typically reﬂect the observation that there
tends to be a two-way process, with individual actions forming social
structures which themselves inﬂuence or constrain individual action; an
observation formalised in structurationtheory, as discussed by Gilbert (1996).
We should note that an investigation often naturally follows a mixture
of the two extremes (rather than a single extreme or intermediate posi-
tion), depending on its focus. Take Ladley and Bullock’s study of the
effects of interaction topologies (market segregation) on market conver-
gence (Ladley & Bullock 2007). This is individualistic in terms of being
agent-based, with adaptive learning algorithms which mean that individ-
uals will develop idiosyncratic behaviour11; yet, it is structural in imposing
abstracted interaction topologies a priori.
Modelling Techniques. Whilst we need to be aware that modelling tech-
niques are just tools, not ideological statements in themselves, some lend
themselves more readily to some positions than others. In the case of this
dimension, approaches such as agent-based models and cellular automata
(CA) are clearly a strong ﬁt for an individualist approach.
11In this case, there is actually no individual variation in the algorithm or its parameters,
but random terms ensure that learning differs per individual.
30Agent-based models which arise from a strong individualist position
can be regarded as paradigmatically motivated, and will tend to refer back
to structural theory in an attempt to show how the individualist approach
shows real-world effects which are more difﬁcult to achieve with structural
approaches. Others may use ABM just for its ﬁt to the problem at hand, or
its naturalness of representation: “pragmatic motivation”, to use Grimm’s
phrase (Grimm 1999).
Micro-Realism and Macro-Realism. Not all individualistic approaches
are valid: there is one particular methodological error that is worth men-
tioning because we believe that it is more prevalent than one might think,
and because it relates to other dimensions in our taxonomy.
One of the appeals of agent-based models is that they allow a more
natural representation for most social systems, since there are explicitly
modelled individuals and the designer can code behaviour as a set of de-
cision rules which match more cleanly to participants’ or observers’ verbal
descriptions of how choices are made. Well presented models of this type,
particularly the inﬂuential ones of Epstein & Axtell (1996), demonstrate
that such a ‘realistic’ approach can generate dynamics which match those
in real-world systems (at least qualitatively), and that the emergence of
such global behaviour from decentralised local rules may apply to a wide
variety of social systems.
This is all ﬁne as it stands, but problems occur when modellers take
this too uncritically as a belief that there is some kind of methodologi-
cal magic in ABM which ‘automatically’ causes realism at the micro level to
be translated into realism at the macro level of system level patterns. We call
this the micro-realism implies macro-realism (MiRIMaR) fallacy. Grimm
captures the idea well:
“Kaiser (1979) comments that individual-based modelling ‘is
naive in the sense that it directly relies on observed data and
interrelations’ (p.134). This naivety bears the risk that mod-
elling is no longer regarded as a mental activity, but as some-
thing that is done by the model entities themselves: simply
cram everything you know into a model and the answers to
the question at hand will emerge via self-organisation. But this
never happens.” (Grimm 1999, §4.1)
This tends to manifest itself in the choice of validation conducted (or,
rather, not conducted). It is also closely related to some other problematic
steps:
31• premature inference that a theoretical model can also act as a de-
scriptive model (Theoretical – Descriptive dimension);
• an uncritical choice of the physical individual as the only correct
aggregation level for the model (Simplifying Reﬁnement – Additive Re-
ﬁnement dimension).
3.2.2 Apriorist – Empirical
The essential distinction here is how much of the model’s design should
be based on hard, empirical data, as opposed to a priori assumptions—
what Brenner & Werker call:
“assumptions [...] based on theoretical considerations, which
result from axioms, ad-hoc modelling or stylised facts.” (Brenner & Werker
2007, §3.2)
Rejection of Abstraction via Apriorism. Where apriorism is explicitly
rejected, there is a belief that models should only include causal mecha-
nisms which have been seen empirically. As an example, consider Brenner
and Murmann’s simulation of the syntheticdye industry (Brenner & Murmann
2003). To be valid in their eyes, their inclusion of chemist migrations to
other countries as a modelled process had to have conﬁrmation from doc-
umentary evidence that this happened (and presumably in large enough
numbers, or with a small enough total number of chemists, so that it could
be justiﬁed as representing a potentially signiﬁcant process). Epistemolog-
ically, this is therefore focusing heavily on causal adequacy.
This position is particularly against strong apriorist assumptions which
are exempted from empirical validation, such as neoclassical economic as-
sumptions of rationality and general equilibrium. It is also against weak
apriorism (where the assumptions are subjected to empirical validation).
We can see the latter from Brenner and Werker’s quote above, where
they reject theory based on stylised facts (which we have already deﬁned
as empirically-backed patterns demonstrated via a previous descriptive
model). Despite being empirically backed, they presumably see such pat-
terns as merely heuristics or selective statistical matches, and value only
actual quantitative values (e.g., total number of ﬁrms or the market share
of a particular country’s ﬁrms, as used in their dye industry model).
As a counterpoint to this view, the epistemological model showed that
the process of observing and selecting empirical data is inextricably linked
with theoretical issues. Therefore, we can never be totally free of a certain
spectre of apriorism— a point conceded by Brenner and Werker (2007,
§3.1).
32Use of all Available Socio-Historical Data. There is the related question
of what types of empirical data to consider.
Social science has a long tradition of using more sociohistorical ori-
ented approaches. Amongst other things, this supports a focus in social
systems analysis on how involved individuals perceive the system, and
thus on testimonies, case studies and the like. Windrum et al. (2007) dis-
cuss case-study oriented models (the “history-friendly approach”), whilst
Edmonds and Moss (2005) put forward the strong position that all poten-
tial types of empirical evidence (including anecdotal evidence) should be
considered:
“[...] if one has access to a direct or expert ‘common-sense’
account of a particular social or other agent-based system, then
one needs to justify a model that ignores this solely on a priori
grounds.”
They stress that simulation (particularly agent-based) and moderncom-
puting power provide the opportunity, not available in an analytic ap-
proach, to include all such ideas and then weed out inappropriate ones
via many simulation runs and analyses.
As well as focusing on the empirical evidence used to build theory,
this stance also tends to endorse a stakeholder-centric modelling process.
The epistemological relativism of such approaches is part of the separate
Universally Simple – Naturally Complex dimension.
3.2.3 Universally Simple – Naturally Complex
Similarly to the previous dimension, this has two closely intertwined threads:
whether simplicity is a valid criterion of adequacy, and whether models
can be more universal or only applicable to very speciﬁc contexts. Typi-
cally, approaches favouring simpler models see them as more universally
applicable, but it is possible to have ‘inconsistent’ stances on these two
areas, as we will discuss (e.g., favouring simple but very speciﬁc, non-
universal models). However, this is rare enough (and problem speciﬁc
enough) that this does not merit splitting this into two dimensions.
Rejection of Simplicity as a Driver for Abstraction. Some academics
reject the basic idea of simplicity in a model being a good criterion for
asserting the validity of one social model over another, despite this be-
ing a strongly held criteria of adequacy for the physical sciences; this is
effectively a rejection of Occam’s razor.
This relates to the fundamental perceived complexity of social systems.
To quote Edmonds and Moss from their KIDS approach:
33“[This] domain of interacting systems of ﬂexible and autonomous
actors or agents [means that] the burden of proof is on those
who insist that it is not sensible to try and match the complex-
ity of the model with the complexity of the phenomena being
modelled” (Edmonds & Moss 2005, §2).
Thus, though complexity theory shows that complexity can arise from
algebraically simple mathematics, this is not a licence to apply simplicity
criteria indiscriminately. Equally, though simplicity might aid model anal-
ysis, this may be largely irrelevant if some irreducible level of complexity
is needed for descriptive accuracy (and, if accurate, model simpliﬁcations
could always be sought later— see the Simplifying Reﬁnement – Additive
Reﬁnement dimension).
The main counter to this is as expressed by Grimm (1999): modellers
should “adopt the attitude of experimenters”, so as to understand how
the model produces the results that it does. Treating models as black
boxes means that analytical adequacy is going to be limited to results-
based comparisons with other theory, so this criticism is more relevant to
models which are not solely acting as descriptive models. This argument
is diluted slightly by the steady increases in computational power, which
mean that a complete sensitivity analysis can be performed on even quite
complicated models in a realistic time frame (though this is no substitute
for true understanding).
Universality and Relativism. It is not necessarily true that a more sim-
ple model will be more universally applicable (generalisable) than a more
detailed one, so universality versus relativism becomes a separate issue. A
simple, abstract model could provide predictive accuracy only for a very
speciﬁc system: perhaps for some highly specialised, predator-free animal
species, whose behaviour was dominated by a small number of gener-
alised physiological, psychological and/or environmental characteristics
(so an abstract model would sufﬁce, but would not be generalisable to
other species which existed in more complex ecosystems).
Sociohistorical approaches tends to reject universality and promote
a more contextual approach, where community-speciﬁc cultural factors
have more impact on behavioural patterns than biological traits. This goes
hand-in-hand with another form of contextualism: the assertion that there
will generally need to be multiple models to explain behaviour, since dif-
ferent system-level effects may be due to very different causes at different
levels of aggregation and at different points on this biological–cultural
axis. This ﬁts with our epistemological model, particularly Azevedo’s
map analogy. Different maps (models) accentuate different features of
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reﬂects the realisation in sociology that competing schools of thought
could sensibly work together, as noted by Eisenstadt & Curelaru in the
1970s (Eisenstadt & Curelaru 1976, p.372).
Where simulations are used to support decision-making, this contex-
tualism can manifest itself as a stakeholder-centric approach, as discussed
previously. The companion modelling approach exempliﬁes a more ex-
treme, relativistic stance; one where the possibility of prediction beyond
the short-term is rejected entirely, and the emphasis is switched to the sub-
jective understanding of the system by its stakeholders. Moss makes this
clear (Moss 2008), asserting that “forecasting over periods long enough
to include volatile episodes cannot be reliable and, as far as I know, has
never been observed”, stressing that this implies that “The purpose of the
models themselves is to introduce precision into policy and strategy dis-
cussions”.
Such a view is much more mainstream in policy-related work not
based on simulation, such as spatial decision support systems (SDSSs).
The primary objective there is normally to provide a more objective and
precise view of conﬂicting stakeholder interests (e.g., wind farm owners,
countryside groups and local residents for a wind farm siting problem).
A spatial model allows the implications of different weightings of inter-
ests to be observed (in terms of their constraining effect on potential sites),
aiding in decision making (see Carver (2003) for a summary, albeit in the
context of the general public as the stakeholders in environmental deci-
sions). In simulation work, however, we are concerned with playing out
the consequences of stakeholder ideas on the causal processes underlying
a system’s behaviour.
Moss goes on to argue that this means that, since the models are con-
textual to the participants, there is no epistemological value in saying that
one model is theoretically better than another if they both model the em-
pirical data equally accurately. That is, some universal brand of analytical
adequacy is inapplicable, since the theory is subjective.
3.3 Dimensions Concerning System Exploration
These relate to how the model is intended to be used in exploring the
dynamics of the system in question.
353.3.1 Stability – Radical Change
This dimension contrasts theories emphasising regulation and stability
versus those emphasising radical change12. Moss (2008) characterises the
debate well. A radical change oriented approach is primarily based on the
“unpredictable, episodic volatility” of most social systems, and evidence
that these episodes typically alter the structure of the system in fundamen-
tal ways. A stability oriented view will be more interested in equilibria
and asymptotic behaviour (an approach often associated with neoclassi-
cal economics), implying a belief that, even if state changes occur, they
are infrequent, predictable or avoidable enough that a stability-oriented
exploration can meaningfully explain, characterise or predict general be-
haviour. Models which rely on historical data to predict future values13
can also be viewed as strongly stability-oriented approaches, in that they
assume that there is some structurally stable pattern over time.
Note that a radical change approach does not imply a rejection of con-
tinuous, differential equation based techniques (such as system dynamics).
Chaos theory has demonstrated that even algebraically simple such sys-
tems can show extreme volatility and unpredictability. In addition, the
combination of such equations in feedback loops (in system dynamics)
can produce varying behaviour, from stable equilibria to periodicity to
chaos. A stability oriented approach would focus on the parameter ranges
where stable behaviour occurred (and their relationships to empirical val-
ues), whereas a radical change one might choose to emphasise that volatile
behaviour occurred at commonly occurring values.
As Richiardi et al. point out (2006, §4.8), individual-based models need
to be clear about whether they are considering micro or macro-level equi-
libria in a stability focused approach.
3.3.2 Qualitative Validation – Quantitative Validation
This dimension is probably the one most inﬂuenced by other dimensions.
For example, models taking a more abstract, structural approach will tend
to favour validation via qualitative features of the real-world system, such
as stylised facts. Models based more on context-speciﬁc, empirically-
aligned theory will tend to focus on speciﬁc validation against quantitative
global values (e.g., market prices); approaches such as Bayesian simulation
12As for the Structural – Individualist dimension, this also echoes terminology used by
Burrell & Morgan in characterising sociological paradigms (Burrell & Morgan 1979); how-
ever, this time, the meaning here corresponds fairly well with theirs.
13Such as Marmiroli et al.’s stochastic model of an electricity market (2007), which pro-
vides risk analysis via Monte Carlo simulation. Factors used in the risk model are repre-
sented by econometric models based on historic data.
36are wholly centred around a quantitative, statistical philosophy for valida-
tion and parameter space exploration (Brenner & Werker 2007).
However, this is not always such a direct correlation. Forecasting mod-
els, despite often being abstract and structural (e.g., an econometrics ap-
proach), sometimes rely on quantitative validation against known time
series of particular variables. In addition, differing scenarios can be used
as a qualitative approach to complement quantitative ones in looking at
the robustness of the model. These can be in two forms:
Theory-Aligned Abstractions. The use of abstracted scenarios (e.g., per-
fect market competition) to conﬁrm that the model aligns with more
classical theory in ‘limiting cases’; Grimm (1999) calls these scenarios
“strong cues”. We see this technique in Epstein and Axtell’s agent-
based Sugarscape models, where they run a scenario with inﬁnitely
lived agents and ﬁxed trading preferences, so as to mimic the as-
sumptions of neoclassical economics (Epstein & Axtell 1996, §4).
As Grimm points out (1999), strong cues are also invaluable in at-
tempting to understand the mechanisms at work inside the (black-
box) model, since they potentially represent strong boundary condi-
tions and simpler parameter sets which may not include the ‘noise’
of a fully empirically calibrated one. In a nutshell, this technique rep-
resents a theoretically-guided exploration of the parameter space, which is
analogous to Richiardi et al.’s “global investigation” (2006, §4.14).
Historical Alternatives. The use of alternative scenarios to investigate pos-
sible other outcomes and the different qualitative effects14. However,
this bears the danger that, given sufﬁciently different scenarios (from
some base case), our assumptions about the system structure and
mechanisms may no longer apply there (i.e., we might not be able
to capture the full range of behaviour in a single model— or at least
not at the same level of aggregation— so our comparison becomes
meaningless).
This is particularly acute for comparisons of models against histori-
cal data, where we know the actual behaviour which occurred. Win-
drum et al. (2007) use the term “counterfactual histories” in such
cases, and point out potential difﬁculties where, say, we are mod-
elling a market where the actual history depended crucially on a
particular action from a particular ﬁrm. In this case, tests using pa-
rameter values other than the ‘real’ ones may be of questionable use,
14We might also compare quantitatively, particularly if the scenarios were fairly similar
to each other.
37since the system might have had a radically different structure in
such cases; or, similarly, our model structure may have been overly
inﬂuenced by the actual history when, in fact, this representeda very
unlikely outcome of the ‘true’ model.
3.3.3 Simplifying Reﬁnement – Additive Reﬁnement
This covers how the model is reﬁned during the course of the research.
Does it: start detailed and then get progressively simpliﬁed via sensitivity
analysis or similar? start at a coarse level and get made more complex until
the desired empirical accuracy is reached? take a more mixed approach
or not consider reﬁnement? In addition, is the reﬁnement being done to
move towards a desired aggregation level, or is the reﬁnement just to make
the model more accurate or simple (i.e., already starting at the desired
aggregation level)?
Edmonds and Moss’s KIDS approach (Edmonds & Moss 2005) starts
with a model detailed enough to include mechanisms based on all avail-
able empirical evidence. Reﬁnement is guided by what “evidence and
[increased] understanding of the model support”, and may be additive or
simplifying.
Other approaches are more intrinsicially wedded to one style of re-
ﬁnement. Grimm (1996), for example, advocates a model which starts at
a high level of aggregation, and uses validation against some pattern in
the empirical data to guide its reﬁnement towards the desired aggregation
level (as required to address the research problem in question). Because
the pattern relates to a speciﬁc spatial and/or temporal scale, it can be
used to direct and constrain each reﬁnement in aggregation (because the
pattern needs to be maintained at its appropriate scale).
Brennerand Werker’s abductive simulation approach (Brenner & Werker
2007; Werker & Brenner 2004) begins with the same kind of ‘sufﬁciently
detailed’ model as the KIDS approach. However, the emphasis is then on
extensive use of empirical data to simplify the model, in terms of con-
straining parameter values and rejecting model alternatives which do not
match the data (all over a set of empirical instances for similar types of
system, which facilitates the later abductive step which is the main differ-
entiator of their approach).
4 Conclusions
We have presented a taxonomy which attempts to deﬁne the most crucial
dimensions for the methodological positioning of social simulations. This
38is backed up by an overarching epistemological model, which provides the
context in terms of what knowledge the model is trying to achieve (and
introduces important concepts such as theoretical and descriptive usage).
The main aims are to:
• Provide all modellers with a framework to help understand how
they and others make decisions on the scientiﬁc positioning of their
research, especially in understanding the often implicit positioning
choices made by their particular discipline. We hope that this can
also be a step towards more useful interdisciplinary discussion, and
perhaps a shared vocabulary.
• Provide social simulation ‘methodologists’ with a useful and philo-
sophically ‘sympathetic’ summary of scientiﬁc positioning concerns,
as well as to stress that these are fundamentally intertwined with
other methodological choices. The hope is that this can stimulate
further discussion on improved protocols and standards for social
simulation.
Below, we brieﬂy compare our taxonomy with some others in the liter-
ature, before discussing the current limitations and potential further work
to progress the aims above.
4.1 Comparisons with Other Taxonomies
Brenner & Werker (2007) propose a two-dimensional taxonomy concerned
with the inference process by which models try to achieve scientiﬁcally
credible results:
• hypothetical–empirical;
• general–speciﬁc.
The former covers the degree to which empirical data is used in model
formulation, and hence maps roughly to our Apriorist – Empirical dimen-
sion. The latter covers how many model speciﬁcations are investigated:
“In speciﬁc analyses only one speciﬁcation of the simulation model is ex-
tensively simulated and the results analysed.” (Brenner & Werker 2007,
§3.1). This is really a categorisation of what validation and sensitivity anal-
ysis is done, not really the ideological why behind it. From our point of
view, this dimension would really be a consequence of decisions made
along all our dimensions.
39The authors also see the validation process as changing the positioning
of models along these axes, since increased use of empirical data in val-
idation makes the model both less hypothetical and less general (since it
is being compared with speciﬁc empirical data sets). This is problematic
since, unless they are including causal adequacy tests outside the scope of
the simulation process, they are conﬂating model formulation with model
parameter constraint: the hypothetical (apriorist) nature of the mecha-
nisms is not affected by how tightly constrained the model parameters are
by empirical validation. As we have seen, descriptive accuracy does not
necessarily imply plausible (or ‘empirical’) explanatory mechanisms.
Moss (2008) uses a related single-dimension taxonomy: “the metaphor
of a spectrum of models ranging from the most theory-driven to the most
evidence-driven”. This is effectively the same angle as that taken by Bren-
ner and Werker, albeit expressed in a different way and for a different
purpose. Both are thus data-oriented characterisations.
Finally, social theorists such as Burrell & Morgan (1979) and Eisenstadt
& Curelaru (1976) have attempted to characterise the paradigms of socio-
logical theory, and their development over time. These analyses certainly
help clarify the general sociological schools of thought, but the aim here
is to pragmatically characterise social simulations in particular and the di-
mensions which most govern the model design and investigation process
adopted.
4.2 Limitations & Further Work
Firstly, there is no real discussion on possible trade-offs between decisions
made on different axes. We have attempted to make them as independent
as possible, but we should bear in mind the possible validity of arguments
such as Levin’s inﬂuential one in population biology (Levins 1966): that
generality, realism and precision cannot be satisﬁed together in any model;
one must always be sacriﬁced.
Secondly, there need to be further attempts to use the framework to
characterise debates and disciplinary differences in the ﬁeld. Appendix A
supplements the main text in this regard, but feedback from other aca-
demics is really required. For example, take the following selection from
Swedberg et al.’s summary of the differences between economic sociology
and neoclassical economics (respectively) as approaches (1987):
• the actor as a social actor vs. a separate utility maximiser;
• actors’ actions as social rationality vs. formal rationality;
40• the results of economic action as tension-ﬁlled interest struggles vs.
equilibriated harmony;
• the general scientiﬁc method as descriptions and explanations based
on empirically adjusted abstractions vs. predictions and explana-
tions based on radical abstractions.
We can see direct correspondences to our epistemological model and
taxonomy, but it would be very useful to get the opinions of researchers
directly involved in these disciplines and their ‘deﬁnition’.
Thirdly, the framework focuses only on epistemological and method-
ological aspects of scientiﬁc positioning. It cannot therefore help answer
all modelling questions, such as (assuming an agent-based model), ‘What
should my agents represent?’. In this case, a decision on the Structural – In-
dividualist axis will give some idea, but domain speciﬁc knowledge will al-
ways be needed to make the ﬁnal choice, which may also have to consider
other factors, such as: researchers’ individual experience and skillsets, the
nature of the empirical data, and the computational resources available.
It is not therefore ‘integrated’ with more descriptive protocols (or social
simulation textbooks), but we feel that there needs to be feedback and con-
siderable further discussion with such methodologists before this is taken
forwards. In particular, there is the key question of how much a ‘typical’
modeller needs to understand positioning issues to the depth given here,
and to what degree they should spell out their decisions in papers.
On the one hand, we believe that such knowledge is important, pre-
cisely because there are many rival approaches, and thus a sea of often
confusing terms and concepts. In this sense, social modelling is seeing in-
teresting times as, for example, agent-based ‘bottom-up’ approaches chal-
lenge the orthodoxy of microeconomic theory. If we use Kuhn’s view of
science again (Kuhn 1970), there are many aspects of a crisis period in
the science, which makes it crucially important to have clear dialogue on
epistemological and methodological issues (even if this ends up being an
awareness of each other’s positions, without compromise on either side).
On the other hand, most scientists doing ‘normal’ research stay within
the bounds of their particular disciplinary paradigm, and this is what is
required to progress science without constant questioning:
“Normal scientists must be uncritical of the paradigm in
which they work. It is only by being so that they are able
to concentrate their efforts on the detailed articulation of the
paradigm and to perform the esoteric work necessary to probe
nature in depth. [...] Much of the normal scientist’s knowl-
41edge [of the precise nature of their paradigm] will be tacit
[...]” (Chalmers 1999, talking about Kuhn’s theory)
So perhaps such discussion should be left to a relatively small group
of methodologists, rather than being an explicit requirement for all.
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42Appendices
A Appendix A: A Summary of Dimensional Classiﬁ-
cations for some Key Approaches
The summary here should help draw together the arguments elsewhere in
this paper. Table 2 shows a compact view of different approaches’ posi-
tioning along the various dimensions.
The abbreviations used for the names of dimensions are as below:
T–D Theoretical – Descriptive.
Model Structure Dimensions System Exploration Dimensions
S–I Structural – Individualist. S–R Stability – Radical Change.
A–E Apriorist – Empirical. Ql–Qn Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation.
US–NC Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex.
SR–AR Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement.
43Approach Dimensions
Structural System Exploration
T-D S-I A-E US-NC S-R Ql-Qn SR-AR
Neoclassical economics - S A US S (Ql) AR
Agent-based
computational economics
(ACE) e.g., Sallans et al.
(T) I (A) (US) - (Ql) (AR)
Companion modelling - - E NC R - (SR)
History-friendly and
abductive simulation
(D) (I) E (NC) - Qn SR
KIDS (Edmonds & Moss) - (I) E (NC) - - (SR)
Grimm’s ecological
modelling
recommendations
- I (A) (US) (S) Ql AR
ALife as opaque thought
experiments (Di Paolo
et al.)
T I A US - Ql -
Table 2: A summary of dimensional positioning for various approaches.
Brackets indicate a weak correlation with the given alternative. A dash
indicates a neutral or balanced position towards the dimension
Clearly, table 2 omits some of the subtleties, but it helps highlight
how the taxonomy provides useful, ‘sharp’ differentiations between ap-
proaches. A slightly more detailed explanation of the table contents fol-
lows (though still with some unavoidable generalisations).
Neoclassical economics
Theoretical – Descriptive Neutral. Concerned with theoretical issues,
but extensively used to try to characterise
and predict macroeconomic trends.
44Structural – Individualist Strongly structural, concerned with system
level properties and equilibrium.
Apriorist – Empirical Strongly apriorist. A priori assumptions and
idealised mechanisms.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Universally simple. Tends to model con-
sumers, ﬁrms, etc. in general, without dis-
tinctions for, say, speciﬁc markets.
Stability – Radical Change Stability. Almost wholly concerned with
equilibria and how markets ﬁnd/return to
them.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Tends to be qualitative (ﬁt to stylised facts),
but also used for quantitative macroeco-
nomic prediction.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Additive. Start with simple models and re-
ﬁne if necessary (honours the criteria of ad-
equacy in the physical sciences).
Agent-based computational economics (ACE)
Theoretical – Descriptive In theory, neutral as for neoclassical eco-
nomics but, in practice (at least currently), is
often concerned with showing inadequacies
with the neoclassical approach and so can
perhaps be better characterised as weakly
theoretical.
Structural – Individualist Individualist. By deﬁnition of agent-based
approach.
45Apriorist – Empirical Weakly apriorist. Still takes some neo-
classical (abstract) theory as starting point
but tends to add more empirically observed
behaviour.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Not as universal as neoclassical economics,
but still tends to look at general cases (de-
spite the implied complexity of the agent-
based approach).
Stability – Radical Change Tends to be neutral. ABMs can show sta-
ble or radical system level effects— the ap-
proach tends to see which emerges and treat
this as one of the main areas of interest.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Weakly qualitative, as for neoclassical
economics.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Tends to be additive, as for the neoclassical
approach, adding different individual varia-
tion to see how this changes the behaviour,
although this is not a hard and fast rule.
Companion modelling
Theoretical – Descriptive Balanced. Validates against both subjective
stakeholder theory and aims for descriptive
accuracy (although to stakeholder-speciﬁc
criteria, such as Turing style tests).
Structural – Individualist Neutral. The approach will depend on the
modeller and stakeholders.
Apriorist – Empirical Empirical. Attempts to capture all potential
mechanisms from stakeholder anecdotal ev-
idence, etc. Rejects apriorism.
46Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Naturally complex. Strongly relativistic po-
sition that models may only be valid to indi-
vidual stakeholders.
Stability – Radical Change Rejects predictive accuracy because of un-
predictable volatility of social systems, so
a strong radical change view. However, in
the scope of a particular model (valid only
to make precise stakeholder ideas and their
short-term implications), model analysis is
neutral in this regard.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Neutral. The stance will tend to depend on
the modeller and stakeholders.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Tends to be simplifying since the initial
model incorporates all possible mechanisms
empirically identiﬁed, but not always (de-
pendent on stakeholder perceptions).
History-friendly & abductive simulation
Theoretical – Descriptive Weakly descriptive. Tends to focus on de-
scriptive models due to context-speciﬁc na-
ture of sociohistorical view.
Structural – Individualist Will tend to model at the aggregation best
aligned to case studies, which will often re-
ﬂect the important role of speciﬁc ﬁrms, in-
dividuals, etc. Therefore, weakly individu-
alist in approach.
Apriorist – Empirical Empirical. Rejects apriorism and focuses on
numerous empirical sources.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Weakly relativistic. Focuses on context spe-
ciﬁc elements identiﬁed from case studies or
similar but not as strong a stance as compan-
ion modelling.
47Stability – Radical Change Neutral. Will depend on the particular his-
torical context. Possibly leans slighty to-
wards radical change due to the historical
view of social struggle.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Quantitative. Focuses on extensive valida-
tion against empirical data and, particularly
for abductive simulation, focuses on ﬁgures
from case studies.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Simplifying. Begins with model incorporat-
ing all potential mechanisms and simplify as
appropriate from empirical comparison.
KIDS (Edmonds & Moss)
Theoretical – Descriptive Neutral. Focuses on descriptive models but
the KIDS approach also allows for the anal-
ysis of several of these to look for more ab-
stract general theory.
Structural – Individualist Weakly individualist. Focuses on the aggre-
gation level that varied empirical data sup-
ports, but this will tend to to focus on varia-
tion amongst ‘individuals’ (e.g., households
in their UK water demand model).
Apriorist – Empirical Empirical. Strongly rejects apriorism.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Weakly relativistic and quite strongly rejects
simplicity as a criteria of adequacy. Tends
to focus on a contextual understanding of
the system, similar to the history-friendly
approach.
Stability – Radical Change Neutral. No speciﬁc stance.
48Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Neutral. No particular validation
methodology.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Weakly simplifying, in terms of assessing
descriptive models and looking for simpli-
ﬁed abstractions. However, the basic de-
scriptive models may be reﬁned either way
from the initial model.
Grimm’s ecological modelling recommendations
Theoretical – Descriptive Neutral. Focus on descriptive accuracy
(against patterns in the data) but also theo-
retical positioning and comparison with top-
down approaches.
Structural – Individualist Individualist. Speciﬁc use of IBMs (though
advocates always considering structural
properties so as to compare with top-down
theory).
Apriorist – Empirical Weakly apriorist. Focuses on comparison
with top-down theory and hence on keeping
a more abstract base but adding in individ-
ual variation.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Tends towards universal, abstract models for
the same reasons as above.
Stability – Radical Change Weakly favours stability since focuses on
looking at system level (emergent) proper-
ties and (stable) patterns in empirical data.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Qualitative. Advocates pattern-oriented
modelling as best way to get more focused
research results.
49Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Additive. This ties in with the pattern-
oriented method and comparison with top-
down methods. There are also pragmatic
reasons for avoiding simplifying reﬁnement
(no incentive for modeller to do it).
ALife as opaque thought experiments (Di Paolo et al.)
Theoretical – Descriptive Theoretical. Concerned with thought exper-
iments exploring the consequences of dif-
ferent theoretical assumptions and how this
questions existing (structural) theory.
Structural – Individualist Individualist due to ALife’s links with
complexity science and thus agent-based
modelling.
Apriorist – Empirical Apriorist. Concerned with fundamental ab-
stractions of life-like phenomena.
Universally Simple –
Naturally Complex
Universally simple, for same reasons as
above.
Stability – Radical Change Neutral. Systems may produce either be-
haviour, although there is normally an as-
sumption that radical changes may well oc-
cur due to the system complexity.
Qualitative Validation –
Quantitative Validation
Qualitative. Concerned with the overall
qualitative system dynamics and how these
compare to existing structural theory and
more real-world instances of the system
abstraction.
Simplifying Reﬁnement –
Additive Reﬁnement
Neutral. May either tend towards additive
(as for ACE) or, when looking for the most
essential properties of life-like systems, take
a simplifying approach.
50B Appendix B: The Epistemological Model as an Im-
proved Validation Framework
In terms of its validation terminology, our epistemological model can be
directly compared to other validation frameworks (Stanislaw 1986; Bailey
1988).
B.1 Stanislaw’s Validation Types
Stanislaw (1986) introduces his own set of terminology which attempts to
isolate the components of overall validity. (These deﬁnitions are used by
Richiardi et al. (2006, §4.28) in their methodological protocol.) He deﬁnes
three canonical types of validation: theory, model and program validity.
The last two correspond to our concepts of analytical and software ade-
quacy (respectively). The other, theory validity, is deﬁned as the validity
of the theory relative to the simuland (real-world system). Rather than our
more restrictive deﬁnition of causal adequacy, theory validity covers the
general validity of the theory as operating through the medium of the simula-
tion; i.e., a combination of ontological, software and analytical adequacy
implies Stanislaw’s theory validity15.
This comparison is summarised in ﬁgure 11.
Looking at Stanislaw’s clarifying example for expert systems provides
some further insight. He argues that, since expert systems only attempt
to functionally replicate the input/output processing of a target system
(rather than modelling the ‘true’ internal processes), theory validity does
not therefore apply (since there is no theory attempting to represent the
true data-generation mechanisms of the real-world system). However, em-
pirical tests of an expert system simulation versus the real-world system
still test the simulation–phenomena link (as well as Stanislaw’s model and
program validity), but he leaves no term with which to describe this ‘ex-
tra’ validation, and can only use terms outside his deﬁnitions, such as
the “overall” validity used by Richiardi et al. (2006, §4.29). It would seem
much more natural to deﬁne a term like ontological adequacy to explicitly
represent the simulation–phenomena validation.
This example also clariﬁes that what Stanislaw means by ‘theory’ is
explanatory theory (as in ﬁgure 11). Expert systems still have their own AI-
related theory, which can be explored via model validity, but this theory
cannot be compared to the real-world system in question as a potential
explanation. Despite the fact that Stanislaw states that the expert system
15This could arguably include causal adequacy as well, if we take the view that Stanis-
law’s theory validity also covers this ‘extra-modelling’ validity. However, this choice does
not affect the argument in this section.
51Figure 11: A comparison of Stanislaw’s validation terminology (normal
face) with those in this paper’s framework (bold face). Note the lack of
equivalent for ontological adequacy
aims to replicate the functionality of the real-world system, he seemingly
does not consider that a potential functional explanation of it might be a
useful explanatory result in itself. This is at odds with philosophers of
science such as Grüne-Yanoff, who argues precisely this as a more appro-
priate aim for social simulations: “It [the simulation] suggests an analogy
between the organisational structure of the simulator and the real-world
system” (Grüne-Yanoff 2009, §4).
To use his example, a particular climate model used an “instability-
dampener” component, despite knowing that there was no explicit, single
real-world mechanism known to perform this function. By successfully
replicating empirical data, this suggested that this set of functionalities
(rather than speciﬁc real-world mechanisms) may reﬂect the organisational
principles of the real-world system. That is, the theory may have been
missing or misrepresenting some mechanisms which, together, produce
some system-level instability-dampening behaviour in some unspeciﬁed
way. This may mean that we should extend our causal adequacy to in-
clude some form of ‘functional adequacy testing’ as well, though this is
52not addressed further here.
B.2 Bailey’s Operational and Empirical Validity
Richiardi et al. augment Stanislaw’s list with operational and empirical
validity (Richiardi et al. 2006, §4.29), as discussed by Bailey (1988). These
cover the validation of the indicators used to formalise ‘fuzzy’ social con-
cepts in their relationship to both the concept (Bailey’s Type B validity),
and the empirical reality (Bailey’s Type C validity).
We regard these types of validation as already included within our
existing set of deﬁnitions. Analytical adequacy covers the formalisation of
the theory into a computationally implementable model (and thus Type B
validity); causal adequacy covers empirical tests for the validity of the
individual mechanisms (Type C validity, and possibly any empirical tests
used to help support Type B validity arguments).
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